Europe Needs to Review its Korea Stance

While the recent NATO summit in The Hague focused primarily on internal alliance matters—and to a lesser extent on Ukraine—Asia was hardly mentioned. This omission is increasingly problematic. In a world where global power is shifting and the United States pivots toward the Indo-Pacific, Asia’s importance to NATO cannot be ignored. The so-called IP4 countries—Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand—are becoming crucial partners. South Korea, in particular, deserves closer European attention. With North Korea now actively involved in the war in Ukraine, Seoul’s role as a strategic actor is growing. To remain geopolitically relevant, Europe must rethink its approach to South Korea, argues Elena Guido, Korea researcher at the LeidenAsiaCentre.

South Korea’s New Leader Faces a Shifting Geopolitical Landscape

South Korea has elected a new president, but the strategic context he inherits is vastly different from that of his progressive predecessors. Lee Jae-myung finds himself navigating a foreign policy environment marked by eroding consensus, shifting alliances, and limited diplomatic space. His administration signals a blend of continuity and recalibration, specifically arriving at a time when traditional approaches to North Korea are becoming less effective and harder to sustain.

The release of the first report by the Multinational Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT, the ad-hoc body set up to compensate for the collapse of the UN Panel of Experts) illustrates some of the difficulties ahead. Though focused on growing military ties between Russia and North Korea, the report exposes broader structural weaknesses: a fractured international sanctions regime and a waning political will.

Lee’s presidency begins under the shadow of these dynamics. While his team already announced the intention to revive dialogue with Pyongyang, the diplomatic and enforcement infrastructure surrounding North Korea is steadily weakening. In this environment, relying on old playbooks is unlikely to yield results.

A balancing act in Seoul

Lee Jae-myung campaigned on a platform of pragmatic engagement. He pledged to ease tensions with the North, restore military agreements suspended under the previous government, and leave the door open for future dialogue. At the same time, he has signaled a willingness to maintain deterrence through strengthened trilateral cooperation with the U.S. and Japan, and has voiced support for preemptive strike capabilities.

This dual-track approach reflects both strategic calculation and political necessity. South Korea remains deeply polarized, and foreign policy continuity often masks underlying shifts in tone and emphasis. Lee appears intent on appealing to a broader electorate by adopting a flexible posture, projecting strength while leaving room for diplomacy.

What truly differentiates his administration, however, is a likely shift in tone and posture. The government is expected to adopt a less confrontational attitude toward China and Russia, while emphasizing national autonomy in both security and diplomatic decision-making. This reorientation suggests a more cautious stance on hardline enforcement of sanctions, particularly those targeting North Korea’s growing military trade with Russia.

MSMT’s weak start

The publication of MSMT’s first report adds a significant, if sobering, layer to the evolving landscape. Focused primarily on illicit arms transfers between North Korea and Russia, the report attempts to map out a growing pattern of mutual support: weapons and munitions heading to Russia, and advanced military technologies flowing back to Pyongyang.

Yet the evidence presented falls short of expectations. Much of the material appears to be derived from open-source reporting or unverified intelligence leaks from South Korean agencies. Some technical details are vague, while others appear inconsistent or questionable. Analysts have pointed out that the report lacks the investigative depth and credibility that once defined the work of the UN Panel of Experts.

This is not simply a matter of substandard research. It reflects deeper challenges in coordination and cohesion. MSMT’s eleven participating countries each bring different priorities to the table. Some are focused primarily on countering North Korea’s proliferation activities; others are more invested in responding to the war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, larger powers, including the United States, may hesitate to act decisively if enforcement efforts interfere with their broader diplomatic or strategic goals.

Sanctions without teeth

The erosion of the international sanctions regime is not new, but it has become more visible, and more dangerous. In past years, enforcement was already inconsistent, with violations frequently going unpunished. Today, however, the situation has worsened. The countries most capable of monitoring violations through maritime patrols, satellite imagery, or field investigations are increasingly deprioritizing enforcement. Coordination mechanisms are underused, and few actors are willing to assume leadership.

The return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency has the potential to exacerbate this trend, if it did not do so already. His earlier North Korea strategy, centered around direct leader-to-leader diplomacy, sidestepped many of the enforcement structures that underpin collective pressure. Should he seek to revive talks with Kim Jong Un, as he has hinted, enforcement could fall further down the agenda, especially if it is seen as an obstacle to broader negotiations involving Russia or China.

This would erode what little leverage the international community still holds. Without credible monitoring and enforcement, North Korea will face fewer barriers in expanding its military partnership with Russia and accelerating its weapons development.

A narrowing diplomatic path

This is the diplomatic context confronting Lee’s administration. North Korea has cut off formal communication channels with the South, publicly declared an end to any aspirations of reunification, and designated Seoul as a hostile actor. The Kim regime has grown more self-assured, increasingly drawing support from Moscow. Its willingness to engage with Seoul, particularly under conditions favorable to inter-Korean cooperation, has diminished significantly.

Although Lee may attempt to reopen hotlines, propose high-level talks, or pursue humanitarian engagement, Pyongyang is unlikely to respond in the current environment. With Trump back in office and North Korea not yet high on his list of foreign policy priorities, there is a real risk that when Washington does eventually turn its attention to the DPRK, it will do so on its own terms, maybe bypassing Seoul and further weakening South Korea’s influence over developments on the peninsula.

The challenges facing Lee are therefore not limited to North Korea’s intransigence. They also stem from a broader international drift. The United States is increasingly focused on China and competition in the Indo-Pacific. Europe remains absorbed in the fallout from the war in Ukraine. In this climate, South Korea risks becoming isolated if it pursues engagement in a vacuum.

A role for the EU?

In navigating this uncertain environment, European actors must recalibrate their framing of South Korea. Seoul is not simply a passive ally within the U.S.-led security architecture; it is an independent actor with its own strategic imperatives. At a moment of global instability, its reluctance to fully align with great power agendas reflects a desire to preserve strategic autonomy.

The international community must acknowledge that sanctions alone cannot serve as a comprehensive North Korea policy. The current regime of pressure has lost much of its effectiveness. If the goal is to disrupt weapons flows, deter missile testing, or create space for diplomacy, then broader engagement strategies with diversified regional actors—including the ROK—are needed.

Finally, if MSMT is to function as more than a symbolic mechanism, it must be strengthened significantly. This means allocating proper resources, increasing analytical independence, and fostering genuine collaboration among participating states. Without these reforms, the body risks fading into irrelevance, alongside the broader global effort to hold North Korea accountable.

Conclusion: The clock is ticking

Lee Jae-myung has committed to preserving peace on the Korean Peninsula. But the tools to achieve that peace have changed. Dialogue alone will not suffice. What is required is a broader strategy: one that combines diplomacy with credible enforcement, strategic clarity, and international coordination.

The MSMT’s underwhelming debut is more than just a bureaucratic misstep. It reflects a weakening of the global mechanisms meant to manage North Korea’s behavior. If Seoul is to remain a key player in shaping the peninsula’s future, it must act quickly to adapt its policies—and encourage its partners to do the same.

For Europe and the U.S. the message is equally urgent. Ignoring North Korea or treating South Korea as a subordinate player will only reinforce the current drift. A stronger, more inclusive approach is the only way to regain control over a rapidly evolving situation.