

Summary of key findings and recommendations

1. **The growth of the number of people, companies and institutions in the Netherlands from the People's Republic of China makes it almost inevitable that the impact of the Chinese government becomes more evident here as well.** This manifests itself not only among companies, students or knowledge migrants, but also within the traditional overseas Chinese communities.
2. **Organizations and leaders of traditional Chinese communities primarily maintain contact with the authorities of their area of origin. In addition, Sino-Dutch organizations and media are willing to accommodate Beijing or at least not antagonize it.** In addition, organizations of Chinese hospitality entrepreneurs are mainly focused at representing the interests of their members. Chinese schools and Chinese churches and temples in the Netherlands are an important focus of local Chinese communities.
3. **Apart from some of the Uighurs, the number of Chinese in the Netherlands who have come here for political reasons (asylum, dissidence) is small.** Politically engaged students, academics and activists are active, as evidenced by a number of recent demonstrations in response to the increasingly tough stance of the Chinese authorities on a wide range of issues.
4. **Contact with Chinese authorities or Chinese organizations in the Netherlands does not in itself mean that one would conform one's views to China, let alone be more receptive to the influence of the Chinese government.**
5. **The vast majority of Chinese in the Netherlands did not know about the existence of the Chinese overseas police stations before they came in the news in the autumn of 2022.** They therefore have obtained all their information about them from the Dutch and other non-Chinese media. **The Chinese in the Netherlands almost unanimously see these police stations as an attempt by the Chinese authorities to intimidate the Chinese population.**
6. **Statistically speaking, the most influenced and impressionable people with a Chinese background living in the Netherlands are men with a low level of education who speak poor Dutch. The most threatened Chinese Dutch are people from Xinjiang and to a lesser extent those who came to the Netherlands for study.**
7. The main factors that make someone conform less to the Chinese authorities are gender (women less), area of origin (Xinjiang and Taiwan less) and level of education (high

less). These findings lead to the following conclusion. **As more “new migrants” from China with a higher educational level and members of the second-generation with higher education are present in the Netherlands, the influence of the Chinese authorities on the Chinese population in the Netherlands will decrease. In addition, it is important to note that a significant majority of the Chinese population in the Netherlands are women who show less conformity.**

8. **Chinese people in the Netherlands consider themselves free and independent of the influence of the Chinese authorities and trust Dutch sovereignty and freedom of expression.** An exception is some of the Uighurs living in the Netherlands who reported threats and intimidation to the police in 2019, although the Dutch public prosecution office was unable to prosecute these cases.
9. **What does emerge from our research, however, is a more general and diffuse sense of what we call China's soft threat.** Many Chinese-Dutch people from the People's Republic and Hong Kong avoid expressing their views on a number of sensitive issues, a form of self-censorship that both serves as a precaution in case it comes to the Chinese authorities attention and to avoid potentially confrontational discussions with other Chinese people.
10. **Although there is little or no active interference among the ordinary Chinese population in the Netherlands, nevertheless a degree of at least partial unwanted influence is present. The degree of resilience against this unwanted influence is generally low, precisely because it is so diffuse and self-evident for many.**
11. Policies to counter this must assume that most Chinese Dutch people feel a connection with China, although this is generally separate from any loyalty specifically to the authorities in China. **One-sided demonization of China or simple choices for or against China should therefore be avoided at all costs.**
12. **Policies that focus too much on the assumption that there must be active and malign interference from China will have little effect and may only backfire.** Suspicion towards Chinese in the Netherlands will only increase due to unnecessary attention to interference. Chinese in the Netherlands could then feel compelled to turn to China for protection.
13. **The widely perceived, soft threat from China is nevertheless a serious cause for concern.** There are a number of things the Dutch government can do about this. **The most important thing is to build on the general trust in Dutch sovereignty and freedom of expression among our respondents.** The increased doubt, frustration and

distrust towards some aspects of the Chinese government's policy among many Chinese in the Netherlands can help in this regard.

14. **Firstly, clear, strong and credible action should be taken where there is an actual threat or interference.** Action regarding these cases could also be taken jointly at European level. **Political asylum or family reunification for members of vulnerable groups from China should be facilitated and supported as much as possible.** In order to facilitate such actions by the government, a monitoring and reporting mechanism for Chinese interference and threats should be established.
15. In addition, it is equally important to strengthen the security in and belonging to Dutch society among the Chinese population in the Netherlands. **Measures to this end amount to restoring or further developing a policy encouraging integration and participation in Dutch society.**
16. Firstly, Chinese organizations, schools, churches and temples should be approached for a **dialogue both on vulnerability and resilience to influence, and on the bridge function between the Netherlands and China that the Dutch Chinese can fulfil.** Here, it is important to include the great diversity among the Chinese in the Netherlands.
17. **Secondly, political participation of the Chinese population in the Netherlands should be encouraged.** This is also the wish of many leaders of the first generation and of the authorities in China and care must therefore be taken to ensure that this does not become an entry point for possible Chinese interference in Dutch politics. Political participation is especially important for Chinese people who have grown up in the Netherlands. For them, participating in Dutch politics has nothing to do with possible Chinese interference, but rather facilitates their full inclusion in Dutch politics and society.
18. **Thirdly, there must be an active anti-discrimination policy.** Particularly Chinese people who grew up in the Netherlands have had bad experiences that highlighted their otherness. As they get older, they therefore tend to seek more contact with other Chinese-Dutch people. The second generation must be involved in policies to tackle stereotyping and discrimination. **Combating a one-sided enemy-image of China, which threatens to become commonplace in many countries, including the Netherlands, is also essential.** Chinese-Dutch people can play a role in this.
19. **Fourthly, the development of a Chinese culture in the Netherlands separate from China should be promoted.** Chinese-language media produced in the Netherlands and news gathering independently from China should be established or restored.

Dutch-language media and cultural activities for the second generation should also be encouraged. Chinese teaching materials produced in the Netherlands should be (re)introduced in Chinese schools at a price that can compete with teaching materials provided by the Chinese government. China's interference or influence on social media should be addressed and, above all, made publicly known.